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DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS,  
AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING
W. Matthews Grant
A well-known objection to divine simplicity holds that the doctrine is in-
compatible with God’s contingent knowledge. I set out the objection and 
reject two problematic solutions. I then argue that the objection is best  
answered by adopting an “extrinsic model of divine knowing” according 
to which God’s contingent knowledge, which varies across worlds, does not 
involve any intrinsic variation in God. Solutions along these lines have been 
suggested by others. This paper advances the discussion by developing and 
offering partial defenses of three such models.
1. Divine Simplicity and the Problem of God’s Contingent Knowledge
God’s contingent knowledge appears to pose a serious difficulty for the 
doctrine of divine simplicity.1 To appreciate this difficulty, consider the 
central claim of the doctrine, the Simplicity Thesis:
ST: The divine substance is not composed in any way; nor are there 
entities intrinsic to God distinct from the divine substance.2
1Difficulties of the sort I present here have been recognized by friend and foe of the doc-
trine. For the former, see Jeffrey E. Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophical Theology, ed. T. P. Flint and M. C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
117–123; and Alexander R. Pruss, “On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity,” Oxford Studies in 
Philosophy of Religion 1 (2008), 157–166. For the latter, see Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 117–118; and Christopher Hughes, On 
a Complex Theory of a Simple God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 107–114. Brower 
and Pruss attempt to solve the problem by suggesting what I call “extrinsic models” of 
divine knowing, but the development and defense of their models is relatively brief (as 
might be expected given that their papers are not focused exclusively on this problem).
2I use “entity” as a generic term covering positive ontological items of any sort, includ-
ing substance, subject, accident, attribute, feature, trope, property, matter, form, essence, 
act of existence, state, action, etc.; but not lacks or privations. The commonplace distinction 
between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” has proven difficult to analyze, but I will assume that 
even short of a satisfactory analysis we can grasp the meaning of the terms well enough 
to proceed. In his explication of divine simplicity, Brower relies on the intuitive distinc-
tion between “intrinsic predication,” which characterizes things “in virtue of the way they 
themselves are” and “extrinsic predication,” which characterizes things “in virtue of their 
relations or lack of relations to other things” (“Simplicity and Aseity,” 124 n. 1). Given this 
distinction (which Brower draws from David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds [Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986], 61–62), we can say that it is (or, at least, can be) solely in virtue of what is 
intrinsic with respect to some subject S—that is, solely in virtue of what S is or has in itself—
that an intrinsic predication of the form “S is F” is true. By contrast, an extrinsic predication 
of the form “S is F” is true, not solely in virtue of what is intrinsic to S, but rather at least in 
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Now, assuming that God is omniscient and there are contingent truths, it 
follows that God has Contingent Knowledge:
CK: God knows some contingent truth.
But one might assume that God’s knowing some truth, T, implies some-
thing intrinsic to God, such as God’s belief that T, or perhaps just God’s 
state or act of knowing T. What’s more, one might suppose that such states 
would not exist were God not knowing T. Thus, we have the following 
thesis about God’s knowledge (the Knowledge Thesis):
KT: Necessarily, God’s knowing some truth T implies some entity 
intrinsic to God that would not exist were God not knowing T.3
Let us take the following as an example of a contingent truth God knows:
(1) Barack Obama is the 44th president of the United States.
Necessarily, God knows (1) only if (1) is true. Since (1) is a contingent truth, 
it follows that God’s knowing (1) is contingent. But, by (KT), God’s know-
ing (1) implies some entity intrinsic to God that would not exist were God 
not knowing (1). Since there are worlds in which God does not know (1), 
there are worlds in which this entity does not exist. So, God’s knowing (1) 
implies some contingent entity intrinsic to God.
Our problem arises when we recall that God is a necessary being:
NB: The divine substance exists necessarily.4
As we have seen, the conjunction of (CK) and (KT) implies the existence of 
a contingent entity intrinsic to God. Since an entity that exists contingent-
ly cannot be identical to an entity that exists necessarily, it follows from 
the conjunction of (CK), (KT), and (NB), that there is distinction in God 
between the necessarily existing divine substance and the contingent en-
tity or entities implied by God’s contingent knowledge. Such distinction 
contradicts (ST). So, (CK), (KT), (NB), and (ST) are incompatible.
part in virtue of S’s relations or lack of relations to other things. We can say, further, that an 
ideal inspector could determine what entities are intrinsic with respect to S by inspecting S 
alone, whereas knowing S’s extrinsic properties (or what extrinsic predications are true of 
S) would require inspecting objects apart from S. Finally, we can say that if an entity that 
is intrinsic with respect to S ceases to exist, then either S itself ceases to exist (if the entity 
is S’s essence or belongs to S essentially), or S undergoes a real, as opposed to merely Cam-
bridge, change. For a discussion of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, see Brian Weatherson, 
“Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edi-
tion), ed. E. N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.
3Although implication is typically thought of as a relation that holds between proposi-
tions, I here use “implies” in an extended sense to relate non-propositional objects. (KT) 
means that in any world in which God knows some truth T, there is some entity intrinsic to 
God that would not exist were God not knowing T.
4I intend (NB) and (CK) to be understood according to the standard, possible worlds 
interpretation of the modal concepts “necessary” and “contingent,” and I intend “God” 
and “the divine substance” to serve as rigid designators. Thus, (NB) means that one and the 
same individual, the divine substance (or God), exists in all possible worlds.
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In what follows, I consider how one wishing to retain (ST) might re-
spond to the problem. Not surprisingly, the options are to reject at least 
one of (CK), (KT), or (NB). In the first section, I consider responses that 
reject (CK) and (NB), arguing that these responses are too costly, or that 
they leave significant problems unaddressed. In the third section, I argue 
that the problem is best solved by rejecting (KT). Rejecting (KT) means 
endorsing an extrinsic model of divine knowing. I present and offer par-
tial defenses of three such models.
2. Problematic Solutions: Rejecting (CK) or (NB)
By rejecting (CK), we could retain (KT) and (NB) without compromising 
(ST); for (KT) without (CK) would not force us to admit a contingent entity 
in God distinct from the necessarily existing divine substance. On the 
other hand, if we reject (NB) and hold that God is, in the standard sense, 
a contingent being, then (ST) could be preserved alongside (KT) and (CK). 
For then the contingent entity in God required by the conjunction of (KT) 
and (CK) need not be distinct from the contingently existing divine sub-
stance. On either solution, God could be said to know whatever truths he 
knows (whether only necessary truths or also contingent) in virtue of a 
single entity that is identical with the divine substance itself.5 Unfortu-
nately, neither solution is attractive.
To reject (CK) requires either denying that there are contingent truths, 
or admitting contingent truths, but denying that God knows any of them. 
The latter violates omniscience. The former means nothing could really be 
(or have been) otherwise, with the consequence that neither God nor any 
human being could really do (or have done) otherwise.
Rejecting (NB) would not work for someone who thinks God’s perfec-
tion requires that he exist necessarily in the standard sense, or who posits 
God to account for beings that exist contingently in the standard sense. 
Still, even were one prepared to reject (NB),6 there remain significant 
problems in retaining (ST) alongside (CK) and (KT). To appreciate these, 
consider the actual world, W, in which God knows
(1) Barack Obama is the 44th president of the United States.
Since (1) is a contingent truth, it might have been false. Indeed, there is a 
possible world, W*, where instead of (1), it is true that
(7) John McCain is the 44th president of the United States.
5I will assume, as is required by these solutions, that a subject can know multiple truths 
in virtue of being in a single state, and that there is, in principle, no upper limit to the num-
ber of truths the divine being could know in virtue of a single state.
6One who denied (NB) might still affirm the traditional claim “God is a necessary be-
ing” according to a different interpretation. For various interpretations, see Brian Leftow, 
“Necessary Being,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 
1998), http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/K052.
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Now, it is natural to suppose that if (7) had been true, God would have 
known its truth. And by “God would have known its truth,” we presum-
ably mean that the very being who in the actual world created heaven and 
earth, and knows (1), would have known (7) were it true. Yet, by (ST) and 
(KT), the God who knows (1) in the actual world does not know (7) in W*. 
To preserve (ST), one has to say that the entity intrinsic to God required by 
(KT) for God’s knowledge of (1) is identical to the divine substance. This 
move makes the divine substance contingent (in the standard sense), but 
that by itself is not a problem so long as we are willing to give up (NB). 
But since, by (KT), this entity would not exist were God not knowing (1), 
a further implication of identifying this entity with the divine substance 
is that, were God not knowing (1), the divine substance wouldn’t exist. 
Thus, the God who knows (1) in the actual world simply wouldn’t be were 
(1) false. But, then, had (7) rather than (1) been true, the God who knows (1) 
in the actual world would not have known (7).
Just as retaining (ST), (KT), and (CK) precludes God’s knowing other-
wise, it also precludes God’s doing otherwise. Consider God’s creating 
our universe (call it alpha). To say God could have created a different uni-
verse, beta, is to say there is a possible world in which God creates, not 
alpha, but beta. It is also to say that
(8) God creates alpha.
is, in the standard sense, a contingent truth, since there will be at least 
one world, the world in which God creates beta, in which (8) is not true. 
Assuming God is omniscient, he knows the truth of (8). But, since (KT) 
requires an entity intrinsic to God that would not exist were God not 
knowing (8), and since (ST) requires us to identify this entity with the 
divine substance, it follows that the God who creates alpha in the actual 
world would not exist in any world in which (8) is false. But, then, there 
is no world in which the God who creates alpha does otherwise than 
create alpha.
3. Rejecting (KT): Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing
The most promising way for a proponent of (ST) to respond to the prob-
lem of God’s contingent knowledge is to reject (KT). To reject (KT), while 
retaining (ST), (CK), and (NB), requires endorsing an extrinsic model of 
divine knowing, a model on which God’s contingent knowledge, which 
varies across worlds, does not involve any intrinsic variation in God. 
On an extrinsic model, whatever variations are required across worlds 
by God’s varying contingent knowledge are outside of, or extrinsic to, 
God. In what follows, I sketch and offer partial defenses of three extrinsic 
models. My aim is not to persuade the reader that one of these models 
is true. More modestly, I will count it a success if I have shown that an 
extrinsic model is prima facie defensible, with the consequence that a 
proponent of (ST) has a plausible response to the problem of God’s con-
tingent knowledge.
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Before introducing the first model, it is useful to consider why someone 
might embrace (KT). (KT) would appear to follow if we accept
(a) God’s knowledge is a species of belief.
(b) Necessarily, God’s beliefs are true, and meet whatever other condi-
tions are required for beliefs to constitute knowledge.
(c) God’s beliefs are intrinsic states of God.
Given (a) and (b), God knows (1) if and only if he believes (1). Add (c) and it 
would seem to follow that God’s knowing (1) implies some entity intrinsic 
to God, God’s belief that (1), that would not exist were God not knowing 
(1). (KT) would also seem to follow if we simply hold
(d) Knowing is an intrinsic act or state of God.
Given (d), there will be some entity intrinsic to God, God’s act or state of 
knowing (1), that would not exist were God not knowing (1).
There is a strategy for blocking the apparent entailment from (a)–(c) or 
(d) to (KT). Suppose God’s intrinsic beliefs (or acts or states of knowing) 
have their content, not in themselves, but in virtue of relations to things 
extrinsic to God. A divine belief, for example, is an intrinsic state, and in 
the actual world God has a belief whose content is that Obama is presi-
dent. This content is given by the way things stand in the actual world. 
Were McCain president, God’s same belief would have a different content, 
reflecting the different facts. Because the content of God’s beliefs is given 
by the way things are, his beliefs are true in every world. But, since it is the 
same beliefs whose contents vary across worlds, the fact that God believes 
different truths in different worlds does not entail any variation in God’s 
intrinsic states.7
Unfortunately, this strategy for accepting (a)–(c) or (d) while avoiding 
(KT) runs afoul of a proposition I find hard to give up, namely, Content 
Essentialism, the claim that beliefs, and states or acts of knowing, have 
their content essentially. Content Essentialism has no implications for 
how content is determined. What it does imply is that, for any beliefs (or 
knowings) a and b, if a and b have different content, they are not the same 
belief (or knowing), and if a belief (or knowing) has a content p, there is no 
world in which the same belief (or knowing) exists without that content. 
Agreeing to Content Essentialism means that God’s belief or knowing (in 
an alternate world) that McCain is president could not be identical to his 
belief or knowing that Obama is president. Given (a)–(c) or (d) plus Content 
7The example could just as easily be given in terms of acts or states of knowing, rath-
er than beliefs. Something like, if not identical to, this approach can be found in E. M. 
Zemach and D. Widerker, “Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge,” Religious Studies 23 (1987), 
25–26 (though Zemach and Widerker’s discussion is not in connection with divine simplic-
ity); and William E. Mann, “Simplicity and Immutability in God,” International Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 23 (1983), 273–274. Of course, to preserve (ST), a proponent of this strategy 
would need to hold that God has just one belief or knowledge state that is identical to the 
divine substance.
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Essentialism, there is something intrinsic to God, God’s belief or knowing 
that Obama is president, which would not exist were Obama not president. 
(a)–(c) or (d) plus Content Essentialism entails (KT).8
Those prepared to reject Content Essentialism can endorse an extrinsic 
model along the lines of the strategy described above, denying (KT) even 
while maintaining that a divine belief or act of knowing is intrinsic to 
God.9 The models I develop, by contrast, are all consistent with Content 
Essentialism. They avoid (KT) by denying the intrinsicness of God’s con-
tingent cognitional states.
3.1 The Belief Model
Our first model, the Belief Model, accepts (a) and (b), but rejects (c), deny-
ing that God’s beliefs are intrinsic.
Let us assume that the objects of belief are propositions and that propo-
sitions are abstract entities of a platonic sort, entities that exist indepen-
dently of the subjects who believe them. To believe is to take a proposition 
to be true. A familiar distinction contrasts “occurrent” with “disposition-
al” beliefs. An occurrent belief is a conscious act of taking a proposition 
to be true. A dispositional belief is a state that disposes one occurrently to 
believe a proposition is true when one actually considers the proposition.
8As is probably clear from the context of our discussion, I mean Content Essentialism to 
range over individual beliefs as well as belief types. Thus, according to Content Essential-
ism, individual beliefs a and b could not be the same individual belief if they have different 
contents. (Put differently, according to Content Essentialism, necessarily if an individual 
belief a is a token of the belief type “that Obama is president” and individual belief b is 
a token of the belief type “that McCain is president,” then a and b are not the same indi-
vidual belief.) Could there be a belief that has no content? If so, I do not intend Content 
Essentialism to apply to such beliefs. I assume, however, that no belief without content 
(if there are such beliefs) could be true or false. Thus, the suggestion that there might be 
beliefs without content is of no use to one wishing to affirm (a)–(c), while avoiding (KT). To 
be clear, I am not claiming that, given Content Essentialism, no entity intrinsic to a subject 
could be a common component of beliefs or knowings with different contents; only that, if 
some entity were a belief or knowing simpliciter, that entity could not exist with a differ-
ent content, with the consequence that no intrinsic belief or knowing could exist with a 
different content. Nor am I claiming that externalism about content runs afoul of Content 
Essentialism. “Externalism” is commonly presented as the view that mental content can 
vary without any intrinsic variation in the mental subject. (See, for instance, Timothy Wil-
liamson, Knowledge and its Limits [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 49–54.) One can 
affirm both Content Essentialism and Externalism provided one denies that a belief or 
knowing whose content is externally determined is intrinsic to its subject. This, I suggest, 
is what externalists should say, and what many do say. Allowing that a mental state might 
be extrinsic to its subject suggests the possibility that the state is at least partially consti-
tuted (and, given Content Essentialism, essentially constituted) by the extrinsic items that 
determine its content. If so, “content externalism,” as it is sometimes called, would seem a 
bit of a misnomer, since what determines content would not be extrinsic to the mental state 
at all, but only to the subject to whom the state belongs. In the extrinsic models I propose, 
the content of God’s contingent cognitions is essentially determined by constituents of 
those cognitions.
9For some who have rejected Content Essentialism apart from theological concerns, see 
John Gibbons, “Identity Without Supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 70 (1993), 59–79; and 
Bryan Frances, “Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks,” Philosophical Studies 133 
(2007), 199–232.
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Since dispositional states are generally thought to be intrinsic to their 
subjects,10 it may be thought that, if God has dispositional beliefs, these 
would have to be intrinsic to God.11 But I assume as a consequence of 
the divine cognitive perfection that whatever God believes he is actively 
believing—that if God has beliefs, they are all occurrent beliefs.12 And it 
is not clear that acts of believing need be thought of as intrinsic to God. 
On the contrary, it would seem open to a proponent of (ST) to view divine 
acts of believing as relations to the propositions believed, relations that 
do not require any intrinsic features of God that would be otherwise were 
the relations not holding, were God not so believing. God’s believing that 
(1), for example, would consist in nothing but God’s relation—the relation 
of believing—to proposition (1). It follows that, were God not believing (1), 
God would be intrinsically no different.13
The central claims of the Belief Model are as follows:
(a) God’s knowledge is a species of belief.
(b) Necessarily, God’s beliefs are true, and meet whatever other condi-
tions are required for beliefs to constitute knowledge.
(e) It belongs to God’s essence to believe whatever propositions are 
true.
(f) All God’s beliefs are occurrent acts of believing.
(g) All God’s acts of believing contingent propositions consist in rela-
tions to propositions that exist outside of God.
(h) These relations do not involve any intrinsic states of God that would 
be otherwise were the relations not holding, were God not so be-
lieving.
10See Sungho Choi and Michael Fara, “Dispositions,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, forthcoming, http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2012/entries/dispositions/.
11There would not seem to be any conflict, as such, in a dispositional belief’s both being 
intrinsic with respect to the believer and having as its object (what the belief is about or 
that) an independently existing proposition. For instance, even given Content Essentialism, 
the belief could be intrinsic provided that what proposition is believed (and thus the con-
tent of the belief) is determined or necessitated by whatever item(s) intrinsic to the believer 
constitute the belief, such that an ideal inspector could know what proposition is believed 
solely by inspecting the believer.
12See also Tully Borland, “Omniscience and Divine Foreknowledge,” in Internet Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy (2006), ed. J. Fieser and B. Dowden, http://www.iep.utm.edu/omnisci/.
13Because occurrent believing and knowing seem to be operations of a subject, I speak 
of God’s occurrent acts of believing and knowing. If one thinks occurrent believing and 
knowing ought to be classified as “states” rather than “acts,” one can substitute “state” 
for “act” without affecting the substance of the arguments that follow. Note also that, al-
though all three models understand God’s contingent cognitions to involve relations to 
objects outside God, they remain neutral on what exactly relations are (universals, tropes, 
or something else).
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What objections can be raised against this account?14
The most likely objections will target (g) and (h).15 With respect to (g), 
some may be puzzled at the thought that believing could be a mere rela-
tion to a proposition. Yet, philosophers have sometimes identified men-
tal acts or states with relations to various objects. Prominent accounts 
of perception, for example, view perceiving as a relation.16 And, indeed, 
some have argued that believing is a relation. Michael Thau, for instance, 
observes that “the philosophical conception of belief according to which 
beliefs . . . are internal states of subjects is usually assumed to be an ut-
ter triviality with nary a thought that it might be a substantive claim for 
which argument is needed.”17 But, says Thau, “Once you see that beliefs 
are propositions and believing is nothing more than a relation to a propo-
sition, there’s no reason to think that the absence of internal belief states 
would make the existence of beliefs in any way less robust.”18
Of course, the fact that some philosopher has identified believing with a 
relation does not make it true. But a proponent of the Belief Model can take 
some comfort in the fact that the move is not unprecedented, even apart 
from concerns about divine simplicity. Furthermore, if believing is taking 
a proposition to be true, it seems that, minimally, believing will involve 
a relation of the believer to a proposition. Considerations of parsimony 
14One question (objection?), which I here take up only briefly, is whether, if we counte-
nance the Belief Model, we shouldn’t make a similar move regarding any predication of any 
property to any substance. Any true predication of the form “S is P” would be made true by 
S’s standing in an exemplification relation to the abstract property P, and S would not differ 
intrinsically were “S is P” false, that is, were S not standing in the exemplification relation 
to P. Readers will differ in their estimates of the plausibility of the suggested move, but it 
should be clear that a defender of the Belief Model is not, as such, committed to its plausi-
bility. A defender of the Belief Model might well think that it makes no sense to speak of a 
subject of which absolutely nothing is true independently of its relations to other entities. 
Certainly, as I have presented the Belief Model, it would be possible for a proponent to say 
that the truth-maker for “God is good” or “God believes whatever propositions are true” is 
simply God. Likewise, it would be possible for him to say that the truth-maker for “Obama 
is human” is simply Obama. The foregoing examples are of essential predications, but a 
defender of the Belief Model need not find the suggested move plausible even if we restrict 
it to all contingent predications. For example, he might think it implausible, when it ceases 
to be true that “Cecilia is 35 inches tall” and is now true that “Cecilia is 36 inches tall,” to 
say that Cecilia has undergone a merely Cambridge change. My thanks to Tom Flint for 
raising the question. 
15Section 3.2 considers an extrinsic model that rejects (a).
16Sense-datum theories of perception, for instance, view perceiving as a relation to a 
sense-datum, while disjunctive theories of perception view perceiving as a relation to 
an ordinary physical object. See Tim Crane, “The Problem of Perception,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2011/entries/perception-problem/. See also Joseph Campbell, Reference and Con-
sciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 114–120; and Tom Stoneham, “A Neglect-
ed Account of Perception,” Dialectica 62 (2008), 307–322. Stoneham (313) even suggests that 
perceptions are relations to objects which might come and go without any intrinsic change 
in the perceiving subject.
17Michael Thau, Consciousness and Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 62.
18Ibid., 66. Thau defends the view again in “Precis,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007), 565–
570. See also Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, 21, where he takes both “believing” and 
“knowing” to be relations of subjects to propositions. 
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might then be thought to place the burden on those who would argue, 
against (g), that believing is something else than (in addition to) this rela-
tion, or against (h), that even if believing is this relation, it is a relation that 
involves an intrinsic state of the believer that would be otherwise were he 
not so believing. Perhaps, the best way to test whether something more 
than a believing relation is needed is to consider whether the objections 
that have been raised against Thau’s proposal pose a problem for the Belief 
Model. I will consider what I take to be the two main objections.
The first objection is relevant to claim (h) of the Belief Model, since it 
allows that believing might be a relation to a proposition, but maintains 
that we need some ground of this relation in the believer. Thus, Joseph 
Levine remarks, “If for S to believe P is for S to stand in a relation to the 
proposition that P, it’s a fair question to ask what it is about S in virtue of 
which he/she stands in that relation. . . . There has to be an answer to the 
‘by virtue of what’ question.”19 Similarly, Frank Jackson argues, “When 
we think of belief as a relation to a proposition, we need to think of it as an 
internal relation in the traditional jargon. . . . When Fred stands in the be-
lief relation to proposition P, there is something about Fred that makes it 
the case that he stands in that relation to P rather than Q, something that, 
as we might put it, points him towards P rather than towards Q. Belief is 
an internal or grounded relation.”20
This grounding objection has significantly more force against the claim 
that human beliefs are without counterfactually varying grounds in their 
subjects than it does against claim (h) of the Belief Model. To see why, 
consider the propositions:
P: Muggsy Bogues is the shortest player in NBA history.
Q: Spud Webb is the shortest player in NBA history.
Why do we need a ground in Fred for Fred’s standing in the believing 
relation to P rather than Q? Presumably, because we need something that 
accounts for Fred’s standing in this relation when it is consistent with being 
Fred that he stand in the relation to Q instead. We can’t account for Fred’s 
standing in the relation by pointing out that P is true; for it is consistent 
with being Fred that he believe Q despite the fact that P is true. Nothing 
about what Fred is essentially explains why he stands in the believing rela-
tion to the true proposition P. So, granting that something must account for 
his standing in the relation, it looks as if the ground will have to be some 
intrinsic, accidental property of Fred that he lacks in worlds in which he 
does not stand in the believing relation to P.
19Joseph Levine, review of Consciousness and Cognition, by Michael Thau, Mind 113 (2004), 
597–598.
20Frank Jackson, “Is Belief an Internal State?,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007), 575–576. 
The passage is from Jackson’s contribution to a Philosophical Studies symposium on Thau’s 
Consciousness and Cognition. 
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Now, it should be clear that the foregoing line of reasoning has no force 
against the Belief Model. Unlike Fred, God’s very essence—as claim (e) 
tells us—is such that he believes whatever propositions are true in any 
given world. What accounts for God’s standing in the believing relation 
to P is simply God’s essence coupled with the fact that P is true. There is 
no need to posit some intrinsic, accidental property in God as a further 
ground for God’s standing in the relation. So, unlike in Fred’s case, there 
is no reason to think that the grounding for God’s relation requires some 
intrinsic state of God that would be otherwise were God not standing 
in that relation. The grounding objection to Thau’s proposal, whatever 
problems it poses for Thau’s account of human belief, gives us no reason 
to reject claim (h) of the Belief Model.21
A second objection argues that beliefs should be identified with inter-
nal states, rather than relations, and thus it is relevant to claim (g) of the 
Belief Model. According to Jackson,
The functional commonplaces for belief are, as a matter of fact, satisfied by 
states of the brain and these states are internal. When I look around me, 
I acquire beliefs about my surroundings that enable me to navigate them 
successfully. When cognitive scientists search for what I acquire when I 
look around me that enables me to navigate my surroundings successfully, 
they find that it is some state of the brain. The details are still very murky 
of course, but it is agreed that the key part of the action is in the brain. As 
many have said, ‘belief’ is a name for what it is that does what belief does, 
and that makes it a name for certain internal states of the brain.22
That beliefs are internal states is here presented as an empirical discovery. 
“Belief” refers to whatever it is that does what beliefs do, and scientists 
have discovered that these are brain states. But, surely, scientists haven’t 
made a comparable discovery regarding God’s beliefs. So, as stated, this 
function objection to Thau has no force against claim (g) of the Belief Model.
To refute claim (g), one would need to show as a conceptual matter that 
only intrinsic belief states, and not believing relations, can play the func-
tional roles that God’s beliefs need to play. Most obviously, God’s beliefs 
21Note that God’s believing relations on the extrinsic model are, on Jackson’s use of the 
term, “internal” or internally grounded. Jackson says “being rounder” is an internal rela-
tion because “when A is rounder than B, necessarily there is some shape that A is, some 
shape that B is, and A’s being rounder than B supervenes on their having those shapes. 
Instances of being rounder are grounded in the nature of the relata” (Jackson, “Is Belief an 
Internal State?,” 575). Since we can assume that Jackson hasn’t overlooked the fact that A 
might cease being rounder than B simply in virtue of a change in B’s shape, without A’s 
undergoing any intrinsic change, it appears that Jackson thinks a subject S’s relation R 
could be internal even without S’s differing intrinsically were S not bearing R. Just as A’s 
being rounder than B is internally grounded in A’s shape together with B’s shape, without 
the implication that A’s not being rounder would entail a change in A’s shape; so God’s 
standing in the believing relation to a true proposition P is internally grounded in God’s 
essence together with the truth of P, without the implication that God’s not standing in that 
relation would entail some intrinsic change in God. God’s believing relations also count as 
“internal” on Lewis’s use of the term. See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 62.
22Jackson, “Is Belief an Internal State?,” 576.
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play a role in God’s knowing and acting. With respect to knowing, if one 
thinks that God’s knowledge about the world is a result of his being acted 
upon by it, and that being acted upon means being affected intrinsically, 
then one might suppose that God’s beliefs are intrinsic states God has as 
a result of being acted upon. But, of course, this argument depends on a 
controversial position regarding how God comes to know. A proponent of 
the Belief Model can reasonably adopt a position on which God believes 
and knows all true propositions without being acted upon by the world; 
in which case this particular argument for thinking that God’s beliefs 
must be intrinsic states vanishes.23
Most want to say that when God acts he acts on the basis of reasons, rea-
sons which, though often hidden from us, can at least in principle play a 
role in explaining God’s actions. On one influential account, for an agent’s 
action to be motivated and explained by a reason requires that the action 
be caused by the reason, where the reason consists in a pairing of belief 
and desire.24 One who accepts such a “causal theory” of reasons might 
think that God’s beliefs can play their causal role only if they are internal 
states. Thau argues vigorously that even if beliefs are relations they can 
still cause actions.25 We need not consider Thau’s case here, however. It is 
enough to note that, as with the previous argument, this argument that 
God’s beliefs must be internal states depends on a controversial position 
that a proponent of the Belief Model need not accept. “Non-causalist” the-
ories are available on which an agent’s belief can figure in the reason that 
motivates and explains his action without the belief’s causing the action.26 
If for God to act for a reason is for him to act for a goal towards which he 
believes the act in question will contribute, the belief figures into God’s 
reason and helps answer (at least non-contrastively) why God performed 
the act in question; but I see no grounds for thinking a belief can’t play 
this role if it is a relation to a proposition and not an internal state.
Perhaps, there are other arguments, not considered here, for thinking 
that only internal states can play the functional roles God’s beliefs need 
to play, but I think the foregoing is enough to show that the Belief Model 
is at least prima facie defensible. Let us turn, then, to consider a second 
extrinsic model.
23If, with claim (e), God essentially believes all true propositions, and with claim (b), 
God’s beliefs necessarily satisfy all requirements for knowledge, then it is not obvious that 
God’s being acted upon by the world is necessary to account for his belief and knowledge 
about it. For a discussion of how God might know without being acted upon, see Eleonore 
Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 159–187. One advantage of the third extrinsic 
model, presented below, is that it provides a ready answer to how God is in cognitive con-
tact with the world.
24See Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” The Journal of Philosophy 60 
(1963).
25See Thau, Consciousness and Cognition, 62–64, and Michael Thau, “Response to Jack-
son,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007), 616–622.
26See, for instance, Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 85–91.
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3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Although contemporary analytic philosophers typically think of God’s 
knowledge as a species of belief, God’s knowledge has not always been 
thought of this way. Beliefs take propositions as their objects, and defend-
ers of divine simplicity have sometimes denied that God’s knowledge is 
propositional on the grounds that propositional knowledge conflicts with 
simplicity. Aquinas, for instance, thought of propositions as entities exist-
ing in the mind which constructs them by composing and dividing, that 
is, by linking and separating subjects and predicates. Since propositions 
are themselves composite, and since propositional knowers know diverse 
things by diverse propositions, Aquinas reasons that the divine intellect 
would be composite were God’s knowledge propositional.27
Of course, the Belief Model depends on an account of propositions 
quite different from Aquinas’s. On the Belief Model, propositions are 
abstract entities of a platonic sort, entities with an existence extrinsic to 
the subjects (including God) who believe them. Couple this conception 
of propositions with the claim that God’s acts of believing are extrin-
sic to him, and no intrinsic diversity or composition is introduced into 
God himself.
Even apart from concerns about simplicity, however, some have ques-
tioned whether God’s knowledge is best understood as a species of belief. 
William Alston argues that the highest type of knowledge, the one we 
should attribute to God, is a type on which the knower is in direct, unme-
diated contact with the object known:
Immediate awareness of facts is the highest form of knowledge just because 
it is a direct and foolproof way of mirroring the reality to be known. There 
is no potentially distorting medium in the way, no possibly unreliable wit-
nesses, no fallible signs or indications. The fact known is “bodily” present 
in the knowledge. The state of knowledge is constituted by the presence of 
the fact known. . . . Since God is absolutely perfect, cognitively as well as 
otherwise, His knowledge will be of this most perfect form.28
If one grants this ideal, an obvious problem arises for understanding 
God’s knowledge as a species of belief. On the view currently standard, 
beliefs take propositions as their objects, but the concrete universe is 
not made up of propositions. Propositions may represent or correspond 
to the concrete universe, but they are not the thing itself. In order to 
secure the highest form of knowledge for God, then, we need an account 
on which God’s knowing is not a species of believing and on which his 
knowledge of concrete reality is direct, not mediated by propositions or 
anything else.
27See Summa contra gentiles, Bk. I, ch. 58.
28William P. Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” Religious Studies 22 (1986), 297–298. See 
also Morris, Our Idea, 84; and Katherin A. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, 2000), 77.
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The Immediate Cognition Model is an attempt to supply such an ac-
count, and one that enables a proponent of (ST) to reject (KT), and thus 
to respond to the problem of God’s contingent knowledge. In its basic 
structure, the Immediate Cognition Model is very much like the Belief 
Model. The difference is that instead of having acts of believing consisting 
in relations to contingent propositions, God has acts of knowing consist-
ing in relations to the contingent realities known. The chief claims of the 
Immediate Cognition Model are as follows:
(i) All God’s knowledge consists in occurrent acts of knowing.
(j) All God’s acts of knowing regarding contingent realities consist in 
relations to contingent realities existing outside of God.
(k) These relations do not involve any intrinsic states of God that 
would be otherwise were the relations not holding, were God not so 
knowing.
It is easy to see why the Immediate Cognition Model would be attractive 
to someone who endorses the sort of cognitive ideal introduced above. 
Just as on the Belief Model a divine act of believing has the proposition 
believed as an essential constituent (along with the believing relation to 
it), so on the Immediate Cognition Model God’s act of knowing has the 
contingent reality known as an essential constituent. God’s knowledge 
of contingent reality is unmediated in the strongest sense possible. Rover 
—all four paws and sixty-three pounds—directly constitutes (with the 
knowing relation) God’s state and act of knowing him. God’s cognitive 
state, his act of knowing, extends out beyond God to embrace the contin-
gent things in themselves, and those contingent realities, in turn, directly 
inform God’s acts of knowing.29
Some of the objections to the Immediate Cognition Model will be very 
similar to the grounding and function objections raised against the Belief 
Model. Answers can be discerned from the responses in the previous sec-
tion. Here I will consider two new objections.
The first new objection concerns worries about divine aseity, worries 
that may arise also for the Belief Model. On both models, God depends 
for his contingent knowledge on something apart from God, either the 
propositions or the concrete realities that are constituents of God’s contin-
gent acts of believing and knowing on the respective models. That God’s 
contingent knowledge depends on the contingent realities known will 
likely seem unproblematic to many readers. Concerns about aseity are ap-
propriate within the context of a defense of simplicity, however, since the 
two doctrines are so closely associated. Jeffery Brower has even suggested 
29Stoneham (“A Neglected Account,” 318–320) similarly recommends his “Purely Re-
lational” account of perception for offering a genuinely “direct” account of perception in 
contrast to standard views on which perceiving takes place by means of an inner represen-
tation or experience.
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that aseity “provides divine simplicity’s chief motivation historically.”30 If 
Brower is correct, then any defense of simplicity that compromises aseity 
will likely prove self-defeating or at least unsatisfactory to proponents 
of simplicity.
Brower suggests that aseity can be saved if we add that God is the 
cause of the contingent objects on which his contingent knowledge de-
pends. The problem, says Brower, is that among the contingent objects 
God knows are the free choices of creatures, and those choices can’t be 
free in the libertarian sense if God causes them. Thus, we are left in a 
dilemma: we can affirm simplicity and aseity, or we can affirm libertarian 
freedom, but not both.31
Brower’s proposal for answering the aseity objection is, perhaps, more 
promising than he realizes; for, while God’s causing the contingent ob-
jects known should be enough to secure aseity, it is arguably premature to 
conclude that God’s causing free choices rules out libertarian freedom.32 
Even so, there is a plausible understanding of aseity on which the Be-
lief and Immediate Cognition models pose no problem, whether or not 
God causes the contingent objects known. For God to be a se is literally 
for him to exist from himself. But a thing’s existence pertains to what it 
is intrinsically, not to how it may be related to other things. Thus, it is 
sufficient for aseity that God not depend on anything else for what he 
is intrinsically.33
The foregoing conception of aseity seems operative in at least one clas-
sical proponent of simplicity. When Aquinas asks whether God is related 
to creatures, he answers in the affirmative, including as examples God’s 
moving them and knowing them. He is not worried that God’s being re-
lated to creatures will make God dependent on something apart from 
himself provided that these are not real relations, that is, provided these 
relations have no foundation in God, and thus make no difference to what 
God is intrinsically.34 There are, then, two viable strategies by which pro-
ponents of the Belief or Immediate Cognition models can respond to the 
aseity objection: (1) Make God the cause of the contingent objects known; 
(2) Point out that it suffices for aseity that on neither model does God’s 
contingent knowledge make God dependent on anything apart from him-
self for what he is intrinsically.
30Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 107. See also William F. Vallicella, “Divine Simplic-
ity,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, http://plato 
.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/divine-simplicity/.
31Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 121–123.
32See my “Can a Libertarian Hold that our Free Acts are Caused by God?” Faith and 
Philosophy 27 (2010), 22–44. See also Robert Koons, “Dual Agency: A Thomistic Account of 
Providence and Human Freedom,” Philosophia Christi 4 (2002), 397–410; and Hugh J. Mc-
Cann, “Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom,” Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995), 582–598.
33For a similar point regarding aseity, see Pruss, “Two Problems,” 164–165.
34See Summa contra gentiles, Bk. II, chs. 11–14. For an explication of the teaching that God 
is not really related to creatures, see Mark G. Henniger, S.J., Relations: Medieval Theories 
1250–1325 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 7.
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The second new objection is one William Hasker raised against Alston’s 
proposal that God’s knowledge is “constituted by the presence of the fact 
known.” Hasker agrees that “immediate, intuitive knowledge, in some 
form very similar to that portrayed by Alston, does indeed represent a 
cognitive ideal.”35 The problem, says Hasker, is that
Temporal entities may . . . be immediately, ‘bodily’ present in God’s aware-
ness. But they can only be so present at the times when they exist to be present! 
But of course, God’s knowledge of such realties cannot be so limited. It fol-
lows, then, that there is a requirement for an inner mental representation 
on God’s part, to enable him to know what has passed away or (perhaps) 
what is yet to come.36
Hasker’s critique of Alston clearly applies to the Immediate Cognition 
Model. On this model, God’s contingent acts of knowing consist in rela-
tions to the contingent objects known, and these objects directly inform 
and partially constitute God’s acts of knowing them. But, if only the pres-
ent exists, then only the present is there for God to be related to, and some 
sort of representation will be needed to accommodate God’s knowledge 
of the past and future.37
A first response to this presentist objection agrees that only the present 
exists, but wonders whether it follows that God can’t stand in the know-
ing relation to past and future events. Does the proponent of this objec-
tion wish to endorse a proposition such as the following?
NR: Nothing can be related to a past or future object or event.
This proposition would likely cause problems for the presentist, too. One 
might suppose, for example, that the “inner mental representation” Hasker 
thinks necessary for God to know the past or future must stand in a match-
ing or, at least, a representing relation to the past or future event it repre-
sents. Similarly, the proposition “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is presum-
ably true because of a correspondence, made-true-by, or supervenes-on 
relation to the past event which it is about. In short, even if only the present 
exists, it is not obvious that an account of knowledge of—or of true proposi-
tions about—the past and future can do without some sort of relations to 
past and future events. Taking such concerns seriously, a presentist might 
be tempted to reject (NR). To do so, however, is to remove the barrier to a 
presentist’s accepting the Immediate Cognition Model. At the very least, 
once relations to the past and future are admitted, an argument is required 
why God can’t stand in the knowing relation to past and future events.38
35William Hasker, “Yes, God Has Beliefs!,” Religious Studies 24 (1988), 389.
36Ibid., 391.
37I assume that, if God can stand in the knowing relation to past and future objects and 
events, then these objects and events can also partially constitute and inform God’s acts of 
knowing them, where these acts are understood as relations to these objects and events.
38The concerns discussed here have much in common with standard objections to 
presentism. For a presentist who rejects (NR), see Mark Hinchliff, A Defense of Presentism 
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A second response concedes that if only the present exists, then the 
Immediate Cognition Model won’t work for God’s knowledge of the past 
and future. It denies, however, that only the present exists—at least for 
God. In one form the second response rejects presentism in favor of an 
eternalist account of time on which all moments of time exist, absolutely 
speaking. In another form it maintains that the question “Which times 
exist?” does not admit of an absolute answer; rather, the answer is relative 
to a reference-frame or perspective. Relative to our temporally bound ref-
erence frame, only the present exists. Relative to God’s eternal reference 
frame, all moments of time exist.39 Both forms of the response, then, reject 
the premise that the past and future do not exist for God to be related to.
Hasker considers the claim that all moments of time are present to 
God but finds it fatally problematic.40 Rather than taking up the debate 
over God and time, I will close this section with some general remarks 
about the force of the presentist objection. First, the “classical theists” who 
embrace divine simplicity, whether contemporary or historical, have as a 
matter of fact almost always held that, in one way or another, the whole 
of time is present to God. Whichever side is correct about God and time, 
the presentist objection will not be found compelling by proponents of 
simplicity. It is based on a premise they (at least most of them) take to 
be false.
Second, and of equal importance, even if one does find the presentist 
objection compelling, this does not give one reason to reject simplic-
ity. The presentist objection, if sound, topples the Immediate Cognition 
Model, but it has no such consequence for the Belief Model. A proponent 
of the objection will agree that propositions such as “Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon” are true even though the events these propositions are about no 
longer exist. Since, on the Belief Model, God knows propositions about the 
past, and whatever true propositions there may be about the future, God 
can have knowledge of the past and future whether or not the past and 
future exist for him to be related to. So, whatever the force of the presen-
tist objection, there is a plausible, extrinsic model of divine knowing that 
would enable a proponent of simplicity to reject (KT) and thus to respond 
to the problem of God’s contingent knowledge.
(doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1988), chaps. 2–3. More commonly, presentists 
have affirmed (NR), arguing that propositions about the past and future can be true even 
without relations to past and future events, either because such propositions don’t need 
truth-makers, or because they have truth-makers that exist in the present. For examples of 
these more common strategies, see Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 119–145; Thomas M. Crisp, “Presentism,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Metaphysics, ed. M. J. Loux and D. W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 236–242; and Simon Keller, “Truth and Truthmaking,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 
(2004), 83–104. To the extent that one finds these more common strategies plausible, the first 
response to the presentist objection loses power.
39For approaches of this second sort, see Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 
“Eternity,” The Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), 429–458; Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Itha-
ca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 230–235; and Eleonore Stump, Aquinas, 131–158.
40Hasker, “Yes, God Has Beliefs!” 389.
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3.3 The Agency Model
Proponents of simplicity have often linked God’s knowledge of contingent 
objects to his causality.41 The precise nature of this link has varied and is 
sometimes difficult to discern. Consider this passage from Barry Miller:
Primarily he [God] knows himself, and precisely in knowing himself, he 
knows everything he himself does. He therefore knows himself as creating 
Socrates, as bringing about the exemplification of F, and so on. . . . He knows 
Socrates in the very act of creating him, by his practical knowledge. The 
same can be said of his knowledge of all other individuals who have existed 
or will exist, as well as of everything that happens in the Universe. . . . Each 
of these creatures and the properties they exemplify are known by God in 
precisely the one act of knowing himself qua creating.42
Here I think we find two distinguishable lines of thought, one promising 
and one not so promising. If the claim is that God knows what he creates 
by knowing what he is intrinsically, then problems arise of the sort dis-
cussed in section 2. If he knows what he creates by knowing some intrin-
sic property distinct from his essence, then he is not simple. If he knows 
what he creates by knowing his essence, then there is no world in which 
the God who created the actual universe does otherwise.
A more promising line is suggested by the thought that God “knows 
Socrates in the very act of creating him.” Defenders of simplicity, includ-
ing Miller,43 have realized that God’s creative, causal agency cannot con-
sist in or involve some intrinsic state of God that would be otherwise 
were God bringing about different effects. Such an intrinsic state would, 
again, either have to be distinct from God’s essence or belong to God’s 
essence, with the familiar result that either God would not be simple, or 
there would be no world in which God creates differently. Defenders of 
simplicity have therefore needed to embrace an “extrinsic model of divine 
causal agency” just as I have been suggesting they embrace an extrinsic 
model of divine knowing. On the extrinsic model of divine agency, God’s 
act of causing or bringing about some effect E consists in a causal relation 
to E, and God would be no different intrinsically were he not standing in 
that relation, were he not causing E. God brings about E for a reason, and 
thus his activity is intentional and purposeful; yet, God’s reason leaves 
him free to refrain from causing E, and refraining is consistent with all 
that God is intrinsically, including his wisdom and goodness.44
41For examples, see Barry Miller, A Most Unlikely God (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1996), 97 and 139–142; David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 86–108; and Rogers, Perfect Being, 71–91. Rog-
ers especially stresses the traditional idea that God’s knowledge is the cause of the things 
he knows. How that might be so, though worth exploring, will not be taken up here.
42Miller, A Most Unlikely God, 97.
43Ibid., 106–112. 
44For defenders of simplicity who advocate this model of divine agency, in addition to 
Miller, see Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 118–120; Pruss, “Two Problems,” 160–163; and 
Timothy O’Connor, “Simplicity and Creation,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), 405–412. The 
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Combining the extrinsic account of divine agency with the thought 
that God knows his effects “in the very act of creating them” suggests 
a third extrinsic model of divine knowing, the Agency Model. The chief 
claims of this model are as follows:
(l) A divine causal act consists in a causal or bringing about relation to 
an effect.
(m) This relation does not involve any intrinsic state of God that would 
be otherwise were the relation not holding, were God not so causing.
(n) God’s activity is inherently cognitional: he knows what he is doing 
in the doing of it, what he is bringing about in the act of bringing it 
about.
(o) God is the cause of all contingent entities.
(p) So, in knowing what he is doing, God knows all contingent entities.
A key assumption of the Agency Model, reflected in claim (n), is that 
intentional activity is inherently cognitional. When I act intentionally, I 
know what I am doing in the very doing of it. I don’t need a separate act 
of knowing to know what I am doing.45 Though not self-evident, this as-
sumption seems plausible enough. In what follows I consider five objec-
tions to the Agency Model and briefly suggest directions for responding 
to them. I conclude by considering whether the Agency Model confers 
any advantage over the Belief and Immediate Cognition models.
Objection 1. We think God knows (or knows about) Napoleon and his 
activities, but we wouldn’t normally say God is causing them. If some-
thing doesn’t exist, then God isn’t causing it. But if God isn’t causing Na-
poleon and his activities, and so also for other past and future substances 
and events, then the Agency Model won’t work as an account of God’s 
knowledge of the past and future. The response will have to be similar, 
I think, to the second response given to the presentist objection in the 
previous section. In order for the Agency Model to work, an eternalist ac-
count of time will have to be assumed, or short of that, it will have to be 
assumed that from God’s eternal reference frame he is causing Napoleon 
and his activities, or is present to his causing them.
Objection 2. Against claims (l) and (m), it may be argued that causes 
must differ intrinsically across worlds in which their effects differ. If 
God is intrinsically no different in the actual world in which he creates 
alpha than in another world in which he creates beta, then God cannot 
name “extrinsic model of divine causal agency” is taken from my “Can a Libertarian Hold 
that our Free Acts are Caused by God?” where I discuss the model (26–30), though not in 
the context of a defense of divine simplicity.
45For a classic statement of this view, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Black-
well, 1957). One might argue that I know only what I am intending to do. Even so, it may be 
responded that in God there is no disparity between what he is intending to do and what 
he is actually doing.
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be said causally to account for alpha. In response it can be pointed out 
that anyone who accepts indeterministic causal relations, whether event 
or agent-causal, must deny that a cause has to vary intrinsically across 
worlds where its effects differ. If event E1 indeterministically causes event 
E2, then there is a possible world in which under the same conditions E1 
does not cause E2. Similarly, when a libertarian agent-cause brings about 
an intention, it is consistent with his intrinsic state prior to bringing about 
the intention that he not bring it about.
Objection 3. It may be agreed that intentional action is inherently cog-
nitional, but denied that this phenomenon makes sense without some 
intrinsic state of the agent that serves as the means by which the agent 
knows what he is doing. On the standard agent-causal account, there is 
a plausible candidate for this intrinsic state in the intention, the bringing 
about of which is the agent’s basic action.46 Since on the Agency Model 
God lacks such a state, it is not possible for him to know what he is do-
ing simply in the doing of it. In response, it can be pointed out that this 
objection really just begs the question by assuming that cognitive states 
must be internal states of cognizers, or that cognizers cognize by means of 
internal states. This assumption is precisely the proposition the extrinsic 
models deny. The objection offers no argument for the proposition, but 
merely assumes what is at issue.
Objection 4. Against claim (o), it may be objected that among contingent 
entities are human choices and that God’s causing such choices precludes 
free will. In response, a proponent of the Agency Model will have to ar-
gue that free will is not ruled out by God’s causing our choices.47
Objection 5. Even if a free choice can be caused by God, some of our 
choices are evil, and there are contingent natural evils, as well. We want 
to say that God permits rather than causes evil, but on the Agency Model, 
God’s knowledge of contingent evils requires that he cause them. To re-
spond to this objection, a proponent of the Agency Model will likely need 
to embrace a privation account of evil, according to which evil, whether 
natural or moral, is not an entity caused by God, but rather a lack of per-
fection due to a thing. An account will then be needed of how God knows 
privations, given that he does not cause them. One answer could be that 
God knows privations indirectly by knowing (a) necessary truths about 
what perfections are due to a given type of thing in specified circum-
stances, and (b) what perfections a thing actually has, which perfections 
God knows in the act of bringing them about.48
46See O’Connor, Persons and Causes, 71–72.
47One could embrace compatibilism or agree with the authors cited in note 32 that God’s 
causing our choices does not rule out libertarian freedom.
48For an account along these lines, see Brian Shanley O.P., “Aquinas On God’s Causal 
Knowledge: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 
72 (1998), 449. In speaking of the perfections “due to” a thing of a particular type, a propo-
nent of this account does not mean to imply that God is bound in justice to bring about these 
perfections; for that would imply that God is failing to do something he ought. If Brower is 
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One thing clear from the brief responses to these objections is that 
defending the Agency Model requires adopting what are, from the per-
spective of contemporary philosophy, a number of highly controversial 
metaphysical and theological positions—(i) that all time is present to God, 
(ii) that free creaturely choices are caused by God, and (iii) that all evil is 
privation. Indeed, with each successive model it looks as if the number of 
controversial claims needed to defend it increases. Thus, defending the 
Belief Model requires none of (i)–(iii); defending the Immediate Cognition 
Model probably requires (i) and possibly (if Brower is right about aseity) 
(ii) and (iii); and defending the Agency Model requires all of (i)–(iii).
On the other hand, each successive model brings certain advantages 
over its predecessor. The Immediate Cognition Model has the advantage 
over the Belief Model that God’s knowledge of contingent objects is direct 
and unmediated. The Agency Model shares this advantage, which can be 
seen from the fact that on this model God knows contingent objects in the 
very act of bringing them about, and these acts, since they are relations to 
the objects known, have the objects known as constituents. What further 
advantage does the Agency Model bring?
While the Belief and Immediate Cognition models tell us what God’s 
contingent acts of knowing consist in, they do not explain how God is in 
cognitive contact with the contingent objects he knows. Presumably, he 
is not in cognitive contact by being acted upon by contingent objects; for 
being acted upon likely involves being affected intrinsically, and being 
affected intrinsically would introduce contingent intrinsic states in God, 
contrary to simplicity. Perhaps, on the first two models, God’s knowing 
contingent objects is a brute fact, with no further explanation as to how 
he is in contact with them. On the Agency Model, by contrast, we have a 
clear answer to the question of cognitive contact. God is in cognitive con-
tact with the contingent objects he knows because he purposefully and 
intentionally brings them about.49
That we have no answer to the question about cognitive contact is, 
perhaps, not too damaging to the first two models. Philosophers have 
puzzled over cognitive contact when it comes to human knowing. Why 
should it be any easier with God? On the other hand, for many propo-
nents of simplicity, the advantage of the Agency Model may not be too 
costly in terms of the controversial commitments one needs to defend the 
model. The great medieval proponents of simplicity, Augustine, Anselm, 
and Aquinas, seem to have accepted (i)–(iii),50 and so do many who work 
correct that answering the aseity objection requires God’s causing the contingent objects he 
knows, then a defender of the Immediate Cognition Model will also need to embrace a pri-
vation account of evil and hold that God knows evil indirectly by knowing the difference 
between the perfections things have and the perfections they should have.
49And God knows privations because he knows the difference between what he brings 
about and what perfections things ought to have given their natures.
50Or so it seems to me. There is, not surprisingly, controversy concerning the correct 
interpretation of these figures on some of the matters in question.
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in the theological traditions they inspire. In the end, a choice between the 
models will come down to judgments individual proponents of simplicity 
make regarding the balance of costs and benefits.51
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